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I. INTRODUCTION 
The evil that is in this world almost always comes of ignorance, 
and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence if they 
lack understanding. 
        Albert Camus1 
 
A common theory about the law is that it should seek to only criminalize 
behavior that is motivated by malicious intent.2  This theory is fettered to the 
core belief that inherently good people have good intentions, and therefore they 
should not be held accountable for mere mistakes.3  While this might seem like 
an innocent and idealistic notion, it is exploited by those who seek to 
circumvent the law and rationalize their illegal behavior.4  
Multiple areas of law that require a specific knowledge standard have 
grappled with the notion of “good faith.”  The reoccurring question asked is 
whether good intentions negate the knowledge requirement of causes of action 
that require a showing of specific intent.5  Patent infringement in the civil 
forum is no exception, and the Supreme Court has put to rest the same issue in 
the context of induced infringement claims.6  
In an induced infringement claim, a patent owner asserts that the opposing 
party has facilitated or otherwise indirectly encouraged third parties to infringe 
upon the patent owner’s rights.7  Indirect infringement commonly occurs when 
a manufacturer or advertiser sells a product and includes information about 
how to assemble that product in a way that would directly infringe a patent held 
by someone else.8  Induced infringement claims against the manufacturer or 
advertiser are critical causes of action for patent owners because it would be 
impractical and inequitable for the patent holder to locate every purchaser of 
the patented product.9  In this way, induced infringement claims provide a 
                                                                                                                   
 1 ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 120 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 21st ed. 1980).  
 2 See Adam L. Alter, Julia Kernochan & John M. Darley, Morality Influences How People Apply the 
Ignorance of the Law Defense, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 819 (2007); see also O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW 142 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. eds., 1881).   
 3 Alter, Kernochan & Darley, supra note 2, at 819–20. 
 4 William H. Theis, “Good Faith” as a Defense to Suits for Police Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 
MINN. L. REV. 991, 992 (1974).  
 5 William Roth, General vs. Specific Intent: A Time for Terminological Understanding in California, 7 
PEPP. L. REV. 67 (1980).  
 6 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys. (Commil I), 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. 
Ct. 1920 (2015). 
 7 Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 399, 400 (2005).  
 8 Id.  
 9 Id.  
3
Eberhart: The Road to Hell was Paved with A Good Faith Belief: Why the Supr
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2015
116 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 23:113 
 
means for patent holders to assert their rights and collect damages when they 
otherwise could not.10  Recently, the Supreme Court rejected a new affirmative 
defense against induced infringement claims based on the defendant’s good 
faith belief in the patent’s invalidity.  The Court held that this good faith belief 
defense could potentially narrow the scope of liability, and allow inducers to 
escape liability altogether.11   
On June 25, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the grant of a partial new trial and remanded a judgment of the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to allow the District Court 
to reconsider the issue of indirect infringement in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco 
Systems.12  Cisco, the alleged infringer of U.S. Patent No. 6, 430, 395, appealed 
the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
primarily on the basis of an erroneous jury instruction.13  That instruction 
suggested that the jury could find Cisco liable for inducing infringement if 
“Cisco actually intended to cause the acts that constitute direct infringement 
and that Cisco knew or should have known that its actions would induce actual 
infringement.”14 
The Federal Circuit panel justified vacating the judgment of the trial court 
for incorrectly instructing the jury to find Cisco liable for inducement based on 
a “mere negligence” standard rather than the correct standard, which requires 
actual knowledge.15  While the issue with the jury instruction was the central 
basis for appeal, Cisco also alleged that the District Court improperly excluded 
evidence, which would have shown that Cisco had a good faith belief in the 
patent’s invalidity.16 
Cisco reasoned, and the Federal Circuit ultimately held, that evidence of a 
good faith belief in the invalidity of a patent is relevant for determining whether 
a plaintiff has met the specific intent prong of an induced infringement claim.17  
Therefore, the jury was entitled to consider any evidence showing a good faith 
belief, with the understanding that the evidence would not “preclude a finding 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Id.  
 11 Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil II), 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1920 (2015). 
 12 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 5, Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil I), 720 
F.3d 1361 (2014) (No. 2012-1042) (2012 WL 1864604, at *57) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellee].  The Federal Circuit ruled that evidence of a good faith belief in the invalidity of the 
patent was relevant for determining induced infringement claims. 
 13 Id. at 1365. 
 14 Id. at 1366. 
 15 Id.  
 16 Id. at 1367. 
 17 Id.  
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of induced infringement.”18  The Court implicitly held that inducers could raise 
a new affirmative defense: a good faith belief in the invalidity of a patent.19   
This Note argues that the Supreme Court correctly rejected the Federal a 
Circuit’s holding and denied the creation of a new affirmative defense for 
induced infringement claims.20  
Part II.A discusses patent law’s purpose and provides an overview of 35 
U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and 282, both of which provide the basis for finding induced 
infringement.  Part II.A also addresses the legal standard of an inducement 
claim and considers the source of contention implicated by that standard.  Part 
II.B of this Note outlines the progression of Commil from the trial court level up 
to the Supreme Court.21  
Part III.A examines the goals of the patenting process and asserts the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Commil reinforced the aims of patent law.  Part III.B 
looks to other areas of law that have a specific intent requirement, as they 
provide guidance on how to interpret the specific intent requirement of 
inducement claims in patent law and justify the Supreme Court’s ultimate 
holding.  Finally, part III.C considers the implications of introducing the good 
faith belief of invalidity of a patent as an affirmative defense, ultimately arguing 
that the Supreme Court correctly rejected the notion that a good faith belief in 
the invalidity of a patent would negate the specific intent prong of inducement. 
                                                                                                                   
 18 Id. at 1369. 
 19 See Bruce D. DeRenzi & Preetha Chakrabarti, The Federal Circuit’s New Factor For Induced 
Infringement Escapes Rehearing En Banc and Creates Significant Uncertainty in Certain Patent Cases, 
CROWELL MORING L. BLOG (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.crowell.com/Locations/New-York/ 
news/The-Federal-Circuits-New-Factor-For-Induced-Infringement-Escapes-Rehearing-En-Banc-
and-Creates-Significant-Uncertainty-In-Certain-Patent-Cases; see also The Increased Value of Invalidity 
Opinions After the Federal Circuit’s Ruling in Commil USA v. Cisco Systems, 31 No. 8 WJCOMPI 1 
(Sept. 19, 2013) (Westlaw). 
 20 The ABA subcommittee’s position supports the Supreme Court’s position on this matter. 
See Proposed Subcommittee Report on Federal Circuit En Banc Review of Good-Faith Belief in Invalidity as a 
Defense to Indirect Infringement, ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, PTO011200 
(Sept. 23, 2013).  
 21 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc. (Commil I), No. 2:07-CV-341, 2011 WL 738871 (E.D. 
Tex., Feb. 23, 2011), aff’d, 410 Fed. Appx. 339 (Fed. Cir. Tex., Mar. 4, 2011), 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. 
Cir. Tex., June 25, 2013), reh’g denied, (Oct. 25, 2013), cert. granted in part, 720 F.3d 1361 (Dec. 5, 
2014).  
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  THE PURPOSE OF PATENT LAW 
Patent law is derived purely from constitutional and statutory authority 
rather than common law.22  Article I, Section 8 of the United States 
Constitution specifically states that “Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”23  Congress has the ability to promote sciences and the arts by 
developing incentives for patent holders to create; patent holders develop their 
patents knowing that they can profit from their creations for at least a limited 
period of time.24  The limited time provision not only incentivizes creators, but 
also compensates patent holders for the “enormous costs in terms of time, 
research and development.”25  
In 1998, the Seventh Circuit held that the following are the three aims of 
patent law:  
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it 
promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation 
and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent 
expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection 
seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for 
the free use of the public.26 
The law fully realizes these goals by conferring to patent holders “a 
monopoly right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the patented invention.”27  Further, since “[a patent] is an incentive [to] 
disclose,”28 the Constitution allows for more than just a method of incentivizing 
the innovation of socially useful products.  The limited time aspect of patent 
                                                                                                                   
 22 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, ROBERT CEARE HIGHLEY & PETER 
D. ROSENBERG, Historical Note on Patents, in 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:25 (2d ed. 2011). 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 24 Id.  
 25 Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation, 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1885 (1974). 
 26 Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 1998).  
 27 Soonbok Lee, Induced Infringement as a Strict Liability Claim: Abolishment of the Specific Intent 
Requirement, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 381 (2012).  See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1996). 
 28 Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 65 S. Ct. 1143, 1145 (1945); JOHN GLADSTONE 
MILLS III, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, ROBERT CEARE HIGHLEY & PETER D. ROSENBERG, A Patent 
as a Grant; as a Contract, 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 22, § 1:2.  
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law ensues that these products will contribute to the public domain upon the 
patent’s expiration.29  
When correctly distributed and regulated, patents serve the interests of not 
only the patent holder, but also the general community.30  However, an 
ineffective patent system risks halting the wheels of innovation and industry.31  
Inventors may not have the incentive to create when others can easily and 
cheaply infringe upon patents by making copies and alternatives.32  In order to 
efficiently regulate this area of law and to ensure patents are enforceable, 
Congress has enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which states, “whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sale, or sells any patent invention” may be liable 
for direct infringement.33  This harm differs from induced infringement, a claim 
Congress created in 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  Induced infringement can hold an 
individual liable for infringement committed by others, whereas direct 
infringement is limited to the defendant’s own infringing acts.34 
1.  Induced Infringement: 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  To prove induced infringement, 
the plaintiff must show direct infringement by “the induced party, the inducer 
must have knowledge of the asserted patents, the inducer must possess specific 
intent and not merely knowledge of the acts alleged to induce, and there must 
have been active inducement of the direct infringer.”35 
The induced infringement cause of action ensures that those who encourage 
or facilitate third parties to infringe are held liable even if they may have 
escaped liability for direct infringement.36  Section 271(b) specifically relates to 
inducement, stating, “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall 
be liable as an infringer.”37  The statute does not explicitly require “any 
knowledge or intent of the inducer, but lower courts nevertheless have 
consistently required a certain level of specific intent in the inducer.”38  It is this 
level of intent that has been the source of contention and has provoked debate 
                                                                                                                   
 29 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 791 (2003).  
 30 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 22, § 1:2; Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292 (1833).  
 31 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 22, § 1:2. 
 32 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, ROBERT CEARE HIGHLEY & 
PETER D. ROSENBERG, Need for Patents, in 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 22, § 1:24; 
Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480 (1853).  
 33 Lee, supra note 27, at 381; 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); Richards v. British Petroleum, 869 F. Supp. 2d 
730, 737 (E.D. La. 2012) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)). 
 34 See Lee, supra note 27, at 381–82.  
 35 Bel Fuse Inc. v. Molex Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 557 (D. N.J. 2014).  
 36 See, e.g., Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 
1575, 1578 (2011).  
 37 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).  
 38 Lee, supra note 27, at 383 (referencing DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2] 
(2010)).  
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about whether actual knowledge is required or whether willful blindness will 
suffice.39  
In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,40 the Supreme Court 
acknowledged this specific intent requirement by stating, “[a]lthough the text of 
§ 271(b) makes no mention of intent, we infer that at least some intent is 
required.”41  The Court also noted the statute’s text was ambiguous and 
wrestled with the definition of inducement, examining how to adequately 
capture the culpable intent required under the statute.42  Ultimately, the Court 
determined that “induced infringement requires under § 271(b) knowledge that 
the induced acts constitute patent infringement.”43  
Further, the Court acknowledged that “willful blindness” would also satisfy 
the knowledge requirement under an inducement claim.44  A showing of willful 
blindness requires that the alleged inducer “(1) . . . subjectively believe that there 
is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate 
actions to avoid learning of that fact.”45  By finding that willful blindness 
satisfies the intent requirement, the Court held that an inducer cannot bury his 
head in the sand and assert ignorance as a defense.  Therefore, in order to 
successfully assert an inducement claim, the plaintiff must show “evidence of 
culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s infringement [and] not 
merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer’s activities.”46  
Once these elements have been met, the inducer may not use intentional 
ignorance to relieve himself of liability.47  
2.  The Previous Dispute About Inducement Claims.  The main area of contention 
regarding inducement claims concerned the interpretation of the specific intent 
prong.48  To be liable for induced infringement, the alleged inducer must not 
only engage in the act of selling, marketing, or creating a patented product 
without authority.  He must also have actual knowledge that his actions 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).  See Richard J. Stark & 
Andrei Harasymiak, Inducement of Patent Infringement: The Intent Standard and Circumstantial Evidence of 
Intent, 2011 WL 601766 (Feb. 2011).  
 40 131 S. Ct. at 2065.  
 41 Id.  
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. at 2068.  
 44 Id. at 2069 (the Court stated, “Given the long history of wilfull blindness . . . we can see no 
reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(b).”).  
 45 Id. at 2070.  
 46 DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc., et al v. Grokster, LTD. et al., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005), Manville Sales 
Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).  
 47 See id.  
 48 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1373.  
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constitute inducement, not merely knowledge sufficient to complete the act 
itself.49  The concept of inducement is primarily derived from tort law and the 
concept of joint tortfeasors.50  This history suggests that in order for a plaintiff 
to be made fully whole, all those involved in the collaborative infringement 
must be held liable no matter how big or how small their role in the 
wrongdoing.  The same principle exists in patent law as the source of 
inducement claims.   
By including an intent requirement within any statute, a legislature imparts 
liability not only for the action but also the culpable state of mind.51  This goal 
relates to the generally accepted idea that the law should only seek to criminalize 
those with malicious or deviant motives.52  The induced infringement cause of 
action provides a means through which those who may not directly engage in 
infringement, but who encourage or facilitate the infringement by others may 
still be held accountable for their actions.53  To be liable, the inducer must have 
actively and knowingly encouraged a third party to infringe.54  Knowing this is 
an essential element to an inducement claim, Cisco attacked the specific intent 
prong as the basis of its defense.55  
In Commil, the alleged inducer Cisco argued that Commil’s patent was 
invalid.56 Because one cannot infringe an invalid patent, Cisco further argued 
that there could never have been any specific intent to infringe.  Therefore, a 
good faith belief of the patent’s invalidity would negate the culpable state of 
mind required under the statute.57  Commil, on the other hand, argued that the 
would-be third party infringer acted with the knowledge that there was a patent 
for the product and that his or her actions would infringe the existing patent.58  
Moreover, Commil argued it would undermine the patent process and 
statutorily required presumption of validity to allow inducers to circumvent 
liability by claiming they were simply mistaken in their belief in the invalidity of 
a patent.59  This new affirmative defense of a good faith belief in the invalidity 
of a patent would have given inducers the license to assume invalidity of patents 
                                                                                                                   
 49 DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1306. 
 50 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1373.  
 51 See HOLMES, supra note 2. 
 52 E.g., Alter, Kernochan & Darley, supra note 2.  
 53 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 54 See id.  
 55 Def.-Appellant Br. Appeal at 41–42, Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil I), 
720 F.3d 1361 (2014) (No. 2012-1042) (2012 WL 830381).  
 56 Id.  
 57 Id.  
 58 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 39–40.  
 59 Id. at 47.  See also ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 2.  
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in contradiction to Congress’s expressed preference.60  Additionally, the 
infringer knew that a patent existed for that product and knew his actions 
would likely or potentially constitute infringement.61  Therefore, Commil 
suggested this awareness would suffice to hold Cisco liable under the statute.62  
The Supreme Court ultimately agreed.63  
3.  The Presumption of Validity: 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).  Thirty-five U.S.C. § 282(a) 
addresses general defenses to patent infringement and states that, “In general a 
patent shall be presumed valid.”64  The statute also states, “[t]he burden of 
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party 
asserting such invalidity.”65  A party must prove invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence.66  The Federal Circuit has previously acknowledged that 
this standard is not easy to overcome.67  The court stated, “in assailing the 
validity of plaintiff’s patent regularly issued by the Patent Office, [the challenger 
has] a heavy burden of proof . . . [such] presumption is not an idle gesture but is 
a positive factor which must be overcome by the one asserting invalidity.”68  
The rationale for presuming the validity of patents is “the basic proposition that 
a government agency such as the [the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO)] was presumed to do its job.”69  
B.  PROCEDURAL POSTURE AND AN OVERVIEW OF COMMIL USA V. CISCO SYS. 
Commil USA v. Cisco System began with a patent infringement claim by 
Commil against Cisco.70  Both Cisco and Commil are suppliers of wireless 
access communications systems.71 Commil originally produced patent ’395, a 
patent for a product that allowed users within a mobile network to move more 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12. 
 61 Id. at 1. 
 62 Id. at 40. 
 63 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems Inc. (Commil II), 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1920 (2015).  
 64 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).  See also ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, 
supra note 20, at 13 (the committee notes that “Commil’s recognition of a good faith belief of 
invalidity as a Defense cannot be reconciled with the presumption of Validity (§ 282)”).  
 65 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
 66 Id.; OSRAM Sylvania, Inc. v. American Induction Technologies, Inc., 701 F.3d 698 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012).  
 67 Anderson Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 265 F.2d 755, 761 (7th Cir. 1959). 
 68 Id.  
 69 ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 13 (citing 
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (C.A. Fed 1984)); see also 
Microsoft Corp. v. 141 LTD. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243 (2011).  
 70 Federal Circuit Vacates $63 Million Patent Verdict, Orders Another Trial Commil USA v. Cisco 
Sys., 31 No. 4 WJCOMPI 2 (July, 25, 2013). 
 71 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1364.  
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readily within the network without losing their connection.72  Commil alleged 
that Cisco developed Wi-Fi access points and controllers that infringed three 
claims of patent ’395.73  The jury trial began in May 2010, and the main issue 
concerned whether Cisco could be liable for both direct infringement and 
induced infringement.74  Cisco defended its actions and software by arguing that 
Commil’s patent was invalid.75 
The jury rejected Cisco’s assertion that the patent was invalid and found 
Cisco liable for direct infringement but not induced infringement.76  The jury 
awarded Commil $3.7 million in damages for its direct infringement claim.77  
Yet despite winning on this claim, Commil filed a motion for a new trial to 
reconsider its induced infringement claim and to reassess damages for the direct 
infringement claim.78 
1.  A Second Trial.  The district court granted Commil’s motion for a new 
trial,79 and the second trial began in April 2011 to determine the viability of an 
inducement claim and to reassess the damages.80  At the close of this 
proceeding, the jury found Cisco liable for inducement and increased the 
damages to $63.7 million.81  After the jury’s determination, the judge further 
increased damages to account for prejudgment interest and costs, ultimately 
requiring Cisco to pay Commil a total of $74 million.82  Cisco appealed this 
judgment to the Federal Circuit, which issued the contentious June 25, 2013 
ruling.83  
2.  On Appeal to the Federal Circuit.  Cisco asserted six different claims on 
appeal to the Federal Circuit.84  Cisco primarily took issue with the erroneous 
jury instruction that allowed the jury to hold Cisco liable for induced 
infringement on the grounds of mere negligence, rather than the required 
knowledge standard.85  Cisco also alleged that the “District Court erroneously 
precluded Cisco from presenting evidence of its good-faith belief of invalidity 
                                                                                                                   
 72 Federal Circuit Vacates $63 Million Patent Verdict, supra note 70, at 2.  
 73 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1364.  
 74 Id. at 1365. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id.  
 77 Reply Br. For Def.-Appellant at 9-12, Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil I), 
720 F.3d 1361 (2014) (No. 2012-1042) (2012 WL 2375037).  Cisco contested this on appeal, 
arguing that Commil was unable to show any direct infringement by any third party actor.  
 78 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1365.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  
 81 Id.  
 82 Id.  
 83 Id.  
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. at 1365–66.  
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to show that it lacked the requisite intent to induce infringement of the asserted 
claims.”86 
The Federal Circuit reasoned that it had established “knew or should have 
known” as the standard for inducement claims in 1990 and reaffirmed it in 
2006.87  However, the court also acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s 2011 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.88 decision, which held that a finding of 
inducement requires actual knowledge that the “induced acts constitute 
infringement.”  There, the Court rejected the negligence standard for induced 
infringement claims.89  Because the district court had instructed the jury to 
determine fault under an erroneous standard, the Federal Circuit panel in 
Commil found that the instruction was prejudicial.90  Thus, in a 2–1 ruling with a 
concurring opinion, the court vacated the judgment, remanded the induced 
infringement claim, and ordered the reassessment of damages for a new trial.91 
The Federal Circuit also discussed whether the district court erred in 
omitting evidence that allegedly would have supported Cisco’s asserted good 
faith belief of invalidity, rebutting the specific intent prong of the induced 
infringement claim.92  Cisco based this argument on Global-Tech, which held that 
a person may only be held liable for induced infringement he had “knowledge 
that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.”93  Cisco’s argument 
suggests that although one may have intentionally committed the acts 
constituting infringement, if he truly believes the patent invalid, then he could 
not have met the specific intent element of an inducement claim.94  
The Federal Circuit panel noted that it was not perfectly clear from the trial 
record why the trial court precluded Cisco from presenting its good faith belief 
evidence at trial.95  Evidence in the pre-trial record revealed that the district 
court likely precluded this evidence because it was a novel issue.96  Although a 
good faith belief of non-infringement has always been relevant for inducement 
claims, such evidence had never been permitted to determine the good faith 
belief in a patent’s invalidity.97  These two iterations of a good faith belief differ 
                                                                                                                   
 86 Id. at 1365. 
 87 Id. at 1366 (citing Manville, 917 F.2d at 553; DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1306 
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).  
 88 Id. (citing Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068). 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. at 1367. 
 91 Id.  
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. at 1366 (citing Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. 2068). 
 94 Id. at 1367. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id. 
12
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol23/iss1/5
2015]         A GOOD FAITH BELIEF OF INVALIDITY DEFENSE  125 
 
in that the good faith belief in non-infringement suggests that the defendant 
truly did not know or believe he or she was infringing a patent.98  An example 
of this kind of belief is if an inventor or seller created a product or sold it 
without knowing or believing that the technology was already patented.99  
Conversely, a good faith belief in the invalidity of a patent suggests that a 
would-be infringer knew the patent existed and knew his acts could constitute 
infringement, but thought that the technology or product was not properly 
patented or should not have been patented in the first place.100  In this situation, 
the inducer made a judgment call that the patent was invalid that turned out to 
be wrong.101  
The Federal Circuit panel in Commil held that evidence of a good faith belief 
in a patent’s invalidity may negate the specific intent prong of inducement 
because the panel saw “no principled distinction between a good-faith belief of 
invalidity and a good faith belief of non-infringement for the purpose of 
whether a defendant possessed the specific intent to induce infringement of a 
patent.”102  The Federal Circuit panel considered decisions from several district 
courts that grappled with the same issue and came to the same conclusion.103  
However, the court found that although this evidence of a good faith belief in 
invalidity is relevant to determine the intent prong of an induced infringement 
claim, the existence of such evidence is not the end of the matter, and the 
evidence does not “preclude a finding of induced infringement.”104  Instead, the 
evidence of a good faith belief in patent invalidity should be admitted for a jury 
to consider when it is determining whether a party had the requisite culpable 
intent to be found liable for an induced infringement claim.105  
3.  Judge Newman’s Concurrence and Dissent.  Judge Newman concluded that the 
“change in the law” proposed by the majority would set a dangerous precedent 
because a defendant could wrongfully use good faith belief of patent invalidity 
as a defense to willful infringement.106  Further, she reasoned that the majority’s 
                                                                                                                   
 98 See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  
 99 See id.  
 100 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1368.  
 101 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 42–43. 
 102 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1368. 
 103 Id.  See VNUS Med. Techs., Inc. v. Diomed Holdings, Inc., 2007 WL 2900532, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 2, 2007); Kolmes v. World Elastic Corp., 1995 WL 918081, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 
1995); DataQuill Ltd. v. High Tech Computer Corp., 887 F. Supp. 2d 888, 1012–13 (S.D. Cal. 
2011); see also Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 243 (2005).  
But see Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 2004 WL 367616, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2004); 
LadaTech, LLC v. Illumina, Inc., 2012 WL 1188266, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 14, 2012).  
 104 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1369.  
 105 Id.  The request for a rehearing en banc was later denied, leading to the petition for certiorari.  
 106 Id.  
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argument that good faith “belief in invalidity can negate infringement is 
contrary to the principles of tort liability, codified in the inducement statute”107 
and that the majority’s holding also contradicted the basic notion that a mistake 
of law cannot discharge liability.108 
Judge Newman also suggested that defendants still had available the 
defenses of patent invalidity and unenforceability to combat a claim of induced 
infringement, so any additional defense would be unwarranted.109  She further 
noted that good faith belief in the invalidity of the patent does not “negate [the] 
infringement of a valid and enforceable patent,”110 and such a finding is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Global-Tech.111  Although 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b) “requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent 
infringement,” the district court in Commil did not hold that belief of invalidity 
was an element or component of induced infringement.112  
Judge Newman also asserted in her dissent that the majority misinterpreted 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Global-Tech by blurring the distinction between 
the knowledge requirement for infringement and the knowledge of validity, 
which “are distinct issues, bearing different burdens, different presumptions, 
and different evidence.”113 
4.  Judge O’Malley’s Concurrence and Dissent.  The firm belief that patent cases 
can only truly be tried “after considering the totality of the circumstances” is the 
primary basis of Judge O’Malley’s dissent.114  Unlike Judge Newman, Judge 
O’Malley agreed with the majority’s decision that the induced infringement 
judgment must be vacated because the jury was instructed using the wrong legal 
standard, and because a good faith belief in invalidity is relevant to defeat the 
specific intent prong of an inducement claim.115  However, Judge O’Malley 
diverged from the majority’s opinion for two reasons.116  First, she believed that 
the claim of inducement must fail as a matter of law because Commil was 
unable to show “any third-party practices” that would constitute 
infringement.117  Second, a partial retrial would wrongfully deprive Cisco of its 
Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.118  
                                                                                                                   
 107 Id. at 1373. 
 108 Id. at 1373–74.  
 109 Id. at 1374.  
 110 Id.  
 111 Id.  
 112 Id. (citing Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2069). 
 113 Id. at 1374–75.  See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).  
 114 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1380.  
 115 Id.  
 116 Id. at 1376.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Id.  
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Judge O’Malley suggested that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings during the 
partial retrial “reflect[ed] the awkward posture in which [the trial judge] had 
placed the case,”119 which resulted in the exclusion of evidence that could have 
shown Cisco’s good faith belief in the invalidity of patent ’395.120  Judge 
O’Malley also reminded the majority of Commil’s argument that it would be 
unnecessarily confusing for the jury to consider such evidence without also 
considering the issue of validity.121  Ultimately, Judge O’Malley reasoned that 
the good faith defense and the validity claims were so “interwoven” that the 
jury must decide both of these issues together.122  A better solution, she 
reasoned, would require both issues, defense and validity claims, to be retried 
together by a third jury in order to not violate Cisco’s right to “pursue a valid 
defense.”123  
Judge O’Malley cautioned that on remand, the trial court should carefully 
craft the jury instructions and should take measures to ensure that the jury 
understands that Cisco was wrong to assume patent ’395’s invalidity.124  
However, she acknowledged that this warning is problematic because it would 
taint the jury’s perception of Cisco and its beliefs from the start.125  
5.  The Supreme Court’s Decision.  Ultimately, Commil petitioned the Supreme 
Court for certiorari on January 23, 2014, and on December 5, 2014, the 
Supreme Court granted the petition on the question of whether the Federal 
Circuit erred in holding that the good faith belief of invalidity of a patent 
defense was viable against an induced infringement claim.126  After hearing oral 
arguments on March 31, 2015, the Supreme Court came down with a final 
ruling on May 26, 2015.127  A 6–2 Court vacated the judgment and remanded 
the proceedings.128  
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the court and remarked that this was 
an issue of first impression.129  The Court unsurprisingly held that the 
defendant’s belief regarding the invalidity of the patent was irrelevant when 
interpreting the scienter requirement for an induced infringement claim.130  The 
                                                                                                                   
 119 Id. at 1379.  
 120 Id.  
 121 Id.  
 122 Id.  
 123 Id.  
 124 Id.  
 125 Id.  
 126 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., SCOTUS Blog, http://www.scotusblog.com/cas 
e-files/cases/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/. 
 127 Id.  
 128 Id. 
 129 Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil II), 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (2015). 
 130 Id. (Justice Breyer is noted however as taking no part in the decision of this case).  
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Court grounded its reasoning in the notion that the specific intent element of an 
induced infringement concern is wholly separate from the issue of validity.131 
Because of this distinction, the Court held that belief of validity may not negate 
the scienter requirement.132  
Further, the fact that infringement and invalidity are considered completely 
separate matters under patent law supports this holding.  They bear different 
burdens, different presumptions, and different evidence.133  Additionally, non-
infringement and invalidity are listed as two separate defenses in patent law.134  
Allowing the defense of a good faith belief of invalidity would inappropriately 
“conflate” the two issues.135  The Court also acknowledged that an individual 
has several avenues to obtain a ruling of invalidity.136  These include filing a 
declaratory judgment action to declare the patent invalid, seeking inter parte 
review at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which may deliver a decision in as 
little as twelve months, or seeking ex parte reexamination of the patent by the 
PTO.137  
The Court clarified, though, that such measures do not preclude the alleged 
infringer from raising the invalidity defense.138  If the court acknowledges that 
the patent is indeed invalid, the alleged infringer will be absolved from all 
liability as is the case in a tortious interference with a contract claim.139  The 
Supreme Court’s holding merely precluded the good faith belief of invalidity 
when the patent was deemed valid and enforceable.140  Such a determination is 
based on critical timing and the orderly administration of the patent system.141  
The Court rationalized this holding as consistent with other areas of civil law 
where an actor who lacked actual knowledge that his conduct violated the law, 
he may still be found liable, as is the case with trespass.142 
The Court reasoned that any other finding would risk undermining the long-
held presumption that a patent is valid and would allow defendants to 
“circumvent” the “high bar-the clear and convincing standard” defendants have 
                                                                                                                   
 131 Id. at 1928.  
 132 Id. at 1931.  
 133 Id. at 1929.  
 134 Id.  But see 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1), (2). 
 135 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1928. 
 136 Id. at 1929.  
 137 Id.  
 138 Id.  
 139 Id.  The Court noted that a month before the second trial, Cisco attempted to obtain a ruling 
from the PTO that the patent was actually invalid.  Much to their dismay, the PTO determined 
that patent was indeed valid and enforceable.  
 140 Id.  
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 1930.  
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been previously required to meet in order to rebut.143  With a final flourish, the 
Court seemingly admonished the lower courts for allowing such a frivolous 
claim.144  Although no allegation of frivolity or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11 sanctions had been asserted, the Court alluded that this may have been such 
a case.145    
6.  Justice Scalia’s Dissent.  Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts in 
dissenting.  Both would have permitted the defendants to raise a good faith 
belief in a patent’s invalidity as a defense to induced infringement.146  Justice 
Scalia began his argument by reasoning that it was “nonsense” that someone 
could infringe an invalid patent.147  He reasoned that because only valid patents 
could be infringed and one could only be guilty of inducement if they intended 
to induce infringement, then it follows that someone may not be guilty of 
induced infringement unless he knows he is in fact infringing.148  
He further found the majority’s reasoning unconvincing.149  He admonished 
that although the law treats infringement and validity as distinct, the good faith 
belief of invalidity conflates the two no more than “saying that water cannot 
exist without oxygen ‘conflates’ water and oxygen.”150  Thus, the fact that 
infringement requires validity maintains those concepts’ separateness under the 
law.151  Justice Scalia also expresses doubt that merely recognizing the good 
faith defense would undermine the strong presumption of validity.152  He 
maintained that even if an alleged induced infringer succeeds in this context, he 
merely escapes liability for a third party’s infringement.153  That does not mean 
that the patent itself wasn’t valid to begin with.154  
Finally, Justice Scalia rationalized that an invalid patent does not confer a 
right to exclusivity.155  Therefore, an individual asserting the good faith belief of 
invalidity defense has not intentionally violated the patent holder’s right, which 
the induced infringement causes of action targets.  Justice Scalia ended his 
opinion by suggesting that he has not proposed creating a defense to statutory 
                                                                                                                   
 143 Id.   
 144 Id.   
 145 Id.  
 146 Id. at 1931.  
 147 Id.  
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id.  
 151 Id.  
 152 Id. at 1932. 
 153 Id.  
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
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liability.156  Rather, he has merely attempted to reconcile the Patent Act with the 
proposed defense to determine whether such a defense could undermine the 
specific intent prong of induced infringement claims.157  He ultimately found 
that it does.  
After several years of litigation, it seems there is finally an answer.  The 
Supreme Court has rejected the good faith of the invalidity of a patent defense 
for inducement and rightfully so.  To hold otherwise would have dangerously 
narrowed the scope of liability for induced infringement claims.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court alluded to other areas of the law that have similarly 
rejected a “good faith” defense.  Upon closer examination of these other bodies 
of law, it seems that the Court’s conclusion was inevitable. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE AIMS OF PATENT LAW AND THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY 
As the Supreme Court articulated, patents are presumed valid, and the party 
challenging validity bears the burden of rebutting it.158  In order to remain 
consistent with the presumption and reinforce the aims of patent law, the 
Supreme Court had to reject the good faith belief defense.  One of the primary 
issues the lower courts faced in determining whether the good faith belief in a 
patent’s invalidity could defeat an induced infringement claim was the fact that 
this defense was a novel issue in patent law.159  In order to adequately justify the 
Supreme Court’s holding, one must consider the premise of the good faith 
belief of invalidity defense in the context of other areas of law.  Part III.B 
considers other bodies of law including tort, contract, and criminal law, which 
have also addressed the issue of whether a good faith belief negates the specific 
intent prong of various causes of action.160  Ultimately, all of these areas of law 
show that the good faith belief of invalidity defense is inconsistent with 
generally accepted norms and American jurisprudence.  Further, Part III.C 
concludes by arguing that introducing such a defense would have negative 
implications.  Therefore, the Supreme Court was right not to allow such a 
defense in the area of patent law.  
Although Commil correctly argued that one cannot infringe upon an invalid 
patent, there is a crucial difference between knowing that acts would constitute 
                                                                                                                   
 156 Id.  
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. at 1929; 35 U.S.C. § 282.  
 159 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1367. 
 160 This Note agrees with the Supreme Court and the ABA subcommittee on this issue.  See 
ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 2. 
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infringement and deciding to infringe or induce infringement anyway.161  In the 
second scenario, the would-be infringer (here, Cisco) has taken his chances at 
facing liability for infringement or inducement and lost.  The latter inducer 
therefore has a far more culpable state of mind than the individual who has a 
good faith belief in non-infringement or the individual wrongly accused of 
infringement.162   
Further, Congress clearly expressed its preference for the presumption of 
validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282 by stating, “a patent shall be presumed valid.”163  
Within the same statute, Congress has afforded the defense of invalidity to 
defeat this presumption.164  However, once an actual or induced infringer has 
failed to overcome the presumption of validity, he may be held liable.165   
Section 282 is silent regarding the infringer or inducer’s state of mind when 
asserting the invalidity defense.166  The statute provides that patents are 
presumed valid unless a showing of invalidity or another applicable defense 
under the statute can defeat the presumption.167  Arguably, Congress’s total 
silence on intent suggests it never intended the infringer’s subjective 
motivations be taken into account when attempting to defeat the presumption 
of validity.168  Congress intended for actual invalidity, not merely an infringer’s 
good faith belief, to defeat liability.169  
B.  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GOOD FAITH BELIEF DEFENSE 
The area of intellectual property law is rapidly evolving.170  With increases in 
technology and innovation, the law has been forced to adapt in order to meet 
society’s constantly changing needs.171  Congress has attempted to bridge the 
gap and enforce legislation with regulatory agencies such as the PTO, which 
attends to the particular needs of patent holders and creators.172  However, 
                                                                                                                   
 161 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1368.  
 162 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 42–43. 
 163 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).  
 164 Id. § 282(b)(2).  
 165 See id. 
 166 See Vivian Lei, Is the Doctrine of Inducement Dead?, 50 IDEA 875 (2010).  
 167 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012).  (Other defenses under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) include non-
infringement or invalidity for the failure to comply with the filing requirements under the statute.)  
 168  See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 47 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989)).  
 169 See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).  
 170 See S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy 
and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69; see also Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: 
Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187 (2000).  
 171 Plager, supra note 170; Merges, supra note 170.  
 172 See Lee, supra note 27, at 381–82.  
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where Congress is silent, the courts may turn to the common law to bridge the 
gap.173  Thus, in order to reconcile the good faith belief of invalidity defense, 
the Supreme Court considered other areas of law confronting this same issue of 
a knowledge standard and whether a good faith belief may negate that 
knowledge requirement in other contexts.174  
1.  In the Context of Tort Law.  To start, the Supreme Court relied upon 
principles from tort law.175  Tort law is publicly made law that is privately 
enforced by individual plaintiffs.176  Similarly, patent law is public made law and 
privately enforced by the patent holder.177  Since the concept of induced 
infringement is primarily based on the notion of joint tortfeasors,178 patent law 
is arguably most analogous to tort law.  This made tort law a logical place for 
the Court to start when considering how other areas of law treat the good faith 
belief defense.  
The notion of holding co-conspirators liable for harms, even if the 
defendant is not the direct actor, is an established concept in tort law.179  One 
author suggests “[t]he common law of torts has long punished not only 
tortfeasors but also those who aid and abet the commission of a tort.”180  
Originally, this “doctrine was initially applied in patent law in cases involving 
what we think of today as contributory infringement.”181  Contributory 
infringement is similar to induced infringement in that a person is held liable for 
providing a means through which another individual may infringe.182  However, 
contributory infringement differs from inducement because inducement 
requires a higher showing of intent.183  Not only must one facilitate the means 
by which to aid another’s infringement (perhaps through supplying component 
parts that in themselves may not infringe but when combined constitute 
infringement), but one must also knowingly intend to aid the infringement and 
recognize they are completing acts that would constitute infringement.184  
                                                                                                                   
 173 Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985).  
 174 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930.  
 175 Id.  
 176 Christian Turner, Law’s Public/Private Structure, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1003, 1012–13 (2012). 
 177 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2012).  
 178 Charles E. Miller, Some Views on the Law of Patent Infringement by Inducement, 53 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 86, 90 (1971).  
 179 Lemley, supra note 103, at 227; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 
499–532 (5th ed. 1984). 
 180 KEETON ET AL., supra note 179, at 499–522.  
 181 Id. 
 182 See Miller, supra note 178, at 90.  
 183 See generally id. at 99–102.  
 184 Lemley, supra note 103, at 232. 
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In addition to its basis on the joint tortfeasors doctrine, the notion of 
inducement closely relates to and derives from the concepts of respondeat 
superior and vicarious liability.185  Absent the direction of the inducer, the 
infringer would not have participated in the acts that constitute infringement.186  
Because the principal inducer benefitted financially from the direct infringers’ 
actions, the inducer should be held liable for their torts.187  
Further, one commentator suggests that the imposition of liability in tort law 
at times turns on whether the tortious conduct was a mistake or an accident.188  
“The legal idea of accident [negates] intention and negligence” because the 
actor never intended the action to occur, nor for the effects of the tortious 
action to take place.189  Additionally, in the context of an accident, it is not 
probable that the conduct would result in the consequences that in fact 
occurred.190  However, in cases where a “mistake” occurs in the tort context, 
“the error is intended and the error consists in thinking that such an effect is 
not tortious.”191  For example, “[i]f the hunter shoots at a thing which he 
reasonably supposes to be a bear, but which turns out to be a shepherd’s dog, 
he has committed a trespass to personal under mistake.”192  This example is 
akin to the good faith belief of invalidity of a patent defense because “the 
contact was intended under a mistaken idea that it was injury to no one.”193  
Thus, in cases where “the effect is intended,” the error does not negate the 
intent element of the tort.194  As the Supreme Court noted, intention to commit 
the act at all—rather than intent to act wrongfully—satisfies the intent prong.195  
Here, a mistake about the invalidity of a patent cannot absolve inducers from 
liability because they intended the actions that constitute infringement, and it 
was probable that the infringement would occur because of the knowledge of 
the patent.196  
Despite the fact that Cisco’s conduct in Commil may be characterized as a 
mistake, rather than an accident, if Cisco could establish that it made the 
mistake non-negligently, then arguably Cisco’s actions could constitute an 
                                                                                                                   
 185 Id. at 228–29. 
 186 Id.  
 187 Id. 
 188 Clarke Butler Whittier, Mistake in the Law of Torts, 15 HARV. L. REV. 335, 336 (1902).  
 189 Id.   
 190 Id. at 336–37.  
 191 Id.  
 192 Id. at 337.  
 193 Id.  
 194 Id.  
 195 Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil II), 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015). 
 196 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 37. 
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accident.197  Thus, characterizing a good faith belief in patent invalidity as an 
accident would excuse the liability.198  A “negligent mistake may be defined as 
one which a prudent man under the circumstances would not make.”199  
However, as the Court noted, Cisco was, at best “careless in entertaining the 
belief” the patent was invalid and acting on it without first inquiring to the 
patent office or seeking a declaratory judgment on the invalidity of the patent.200  
It is well settled that “in the case of mistake the defendant is usually held to act 
at his peril.”201  Even assuming Cisco acted under a good faith belief in the 
invalidity of a patent, it acted with knowledge of the patent’s existence, and thus 
acted at its own peril.202  As such, the Supreme Court correctly found that 
liability under a traditional tort theory would attach.203  
2.  In the Context of the Social Contract Theory and Traditional Contract Law.  The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that if the patent is truly invalid, induced 
infringers would not be held liable, just as those accused of tortious interference 
with a contract may not be held liable if a contract is in fact invalid.204  What 
makes the traditional contract analysis in this context so difficult is that in an 
induced infringement claim, the one at fault is arguably not a party to the 
contract, but rather, a third party actor.205  Therefore, Cisco’s actions, at first 
glance, seem most analogous to a tortious interference with a contract, which is 
actually a blend of both tort and contract law causes of action.206  From a 
broader perspective, however, society is actually a party to the patent, 
represented by the government and the patent holder.  
Congress has conferred authority to the patent office to enter into private 
contracts with patent holders in order to ensure that society continues to 
benefit from the creations of inventors and producers.207  In this regard, the 
                                                                                                                   
 197 Whittier, supra note 188, at 339.  
 198 Id.  
 199 Id.  
 200 Id. at 337 (stating that if there was no negligence in making the mistake, the case was one of 
accident and would prevent recovery); Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil II), 135 
S. Ct. 1920, 1929 (2015). 
 201 Whittier, supra note 188, at 352. 
 202 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 34. 
 203 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1929.  
 204 Id. at 1920, 1930. 
 205 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 9 (1981).  
 206 See Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort 
and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1982).  
 207 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003) (quoting 
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo for granting a patent 
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.”) 
(quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
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American people have consented to respect the patents issued by the patent 
office and the rights of patent holders.208  The infringer and inducer, as citizens 
of the United States, have also consented to follow the laws of the nation and 
to respect the wishes of Congress by respecting the patent process.209  
Infringing or inducing others to infringe a patent materially breaches the social 
contract entered into by society’s agents, Congress and the PTO.210  
Although the Court did not delve into this method of reasoning, this social 
contract theory applies to Commil.  By doing business in the American market 
and being an American company, Cisco has consented to the laws enacted by 
Congress and the social contract entered into by society’s agents.  When Cisco 
infringed and induced infringement on Commil’s wireless communications 
systems, it breached the social contract and cannot assert that the breach was 
justified simply because it presumed the contract was invalid or 
unenforceable.211  
Further, patent law can readily be analogized to contract law because “the 
weight of authority is that a patent is very much a contract between the inventor 
and the United States.”212 The Court correctly acknowledged that a patent 
confers the right of the inventor to “practice his invention and the right to 
allow another to practice such invention under terms agreed to between the 
parties.”213  Unlike copyright, which requires the author to disclose his idea or 
concept to the audience upon publication, patents protect the patent holder’s 
ideas and technology for the terms of the patent.214  This “exchange” between 
the patent holder and the government is commonly referred to as a “quid pro 
quo” between the patent holder and the government.215  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the 
Supreme Court noted that “complete disclosure as a precondition of a patent is 
part of the quid pro quo that justifies the limited monopoly for the inventor as 
consideration for full and immediate access by the public when the time 
                                                                                                                   
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors . . . Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards 
commensurate with services rendered.”)))).   
 208 See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999).  
 209 Id.  
 210 Id. 
 211 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981); see also 
id. §§ 153–154. 
 212 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, ROBERT CEARE HIGHLEY & PETER 
D. ROSENBERG, 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:2 (2d ed. 2014); Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1929.  
 213 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 212, § 1:3. 
 214 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003).  
 215 Id. (referencing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)); see, e.g., 
J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi–Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (“The 
disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’ ” (quoting 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))). 
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expires.”216  Also, the Eldred court cited language in which the patent system 
was described as a “contract” between the patent holder and the government.217  
This quid pro quo language also bolsters the notion that the rights between 
contracting parties in traditional contract law are similar to the rights of the 
patent holder.218 
Further, like patents, contracts are generally presumed valid and 
enforceable.219  It is the burden of the party asserting invalidity to prove that the 
contract is unenforceable or void as a matter of public policy.220  
Moreover, contract law also has a similar concept to patent law’s willful 
blindness doctrine called “conscious ignorance.”221  Under § 154 of the Second 
Restatement of Contracts, the party who acts knowing that he has limited 
knowledge of the terms of the contract under the circumstances, “bears the risk 
of the mistake.”222  Applying this principle to Commil, the Court acted wisely 
when finding that good faith belief of invalidity of a patent is not a viable 
defense under a contract theory because Cisco acted based on its knowledge 
that a patent was in place, but failed to reconcile the validity of the patent at the 
outset.223   
3.  Tortious Interference with Contract.  The Supreme Court in Commil did 
reference, however, the similar nature of a tortious interference with a contract 
claim and an induced infringement claim.224  Tortious interference with a 
contract blends tort and contract law.225  This cause of action is recognized 
under the common law to give “a party to a contract . . . a right of action 
against a third-party who intentionally and unjustifiably induces a breach of the 
                                                                                                                   
 216 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 225; see Graham, 383 U.S. at 5.  
 217 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 225 (quoting “Attorney General Wirt made this precise point in his 
argument in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., at 175, 6 L. Ed. 23: ‘It [a patent] is virtually a contract 
between each patentee and the people of the United States, by which the time of exclusive and 
secure enjoyment is limited, and then the benefit of the discovery results to the public.’ ”). 
 218 See Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HARV. L. REV. 121, 134 (1914) 
(“[Q]uid pro quo (i. e., present value actually received on each side in the making of the contract).”). 
 219 Ohio & M.R. Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U.S. 258 (1877) (“Where such a contract is not, on its 
face, necessarily beyond the scope of the powers of the corporation, it will, in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, be presumed to be valid.”). 
 220 See generally Meunier v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:12-cv-01005-JE, 2014 WL 
4792935 (Dis. Or. Sept. 24, 2014); In re Walker, 515 B.R. 725 (Banker W.D. Mo. 2014); Mansfield 
v. Vanderbilt Mortg. and Finance, Inc., No. 7:13-CV-257-FL, 2014 WL 2712327 (E.D. N.C. June 
16, 2014); Brondyke v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (S.D. Iowa 2013).  
 221 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154, cmt. (c) (1981). 
 222 Id.  
 223 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. 1929.  
 224 Id. at 1930.  
 225 See Perlman, supra note 206, at 61.  
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contract with the other party to the contract.”226  The inducer has caused the 
buyers of its product to directly infringe, and has interfered with the business 
relationship between the patent holder and the government.227  Further, the 
underlying principles of both tortious interference with a contract and the 
induced infringement causes of action are similar.  A tortious interference with 
a contract claim seeks to hold those who “intentionally intermeddle with the 
business affairs of another” liable.228  Like the inducement statute,229 the 
tortious interference with a contract cause of action targets the actual breach of 
the contract, but the inducer’s state of mind.230   
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 recognizes the claim of tortious 
interference with a contract and states:  
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the 
performance of a contract . . . between another and a third 
person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to 
perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the 
pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third 
person to perform the contract.231 
The common elements for tortious interference with a contract mirror 
inducement in several respects.  Those include the existence of a contract or 
business relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, the defendant’s 
knowledge of the existence of the contract, the defendant acts in an 
unjustifiable manner in causing either the third party to breach or make the 
performance of the contract impossible, and damages.232 
Considering Cisco’s actions in light of the elements of tortious interference 
with a contract, liability naturally follows.  The district court rejected the notion 
that the patent was invalid or unenforceable, and a finding to the contrary 
would prevent a finding of direct infringement.233  Although Cisco argued that 
it acted in justifiable reliance on the invalidity of the patent, as the Supreme 
Court noted, they had no justifiable belief or reason to think that the patent was 
                                                                                                                   
 226 Mark S. Dennison, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship Involving Sale of Real Estate, 64 
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 273, 284 (2001).  
 227 See Allen, supra note 208, at 2; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010); U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 228 See Dennison, supra note 226.   
 229 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). 
 230 See Perlman, supra note 206, at 61. 
 231 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979). 
 232 Id.; see also Donathan v. McDill, 800 S.W.2d 433, 434 (1990); Second Continental, Inc. v. 
Atlanta E-Z Builders, Inc., 514 S.E.2d 846, 849 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999), cert. dismissed, 1999 Ga. 
LEXIS 747 (1999); Baldwin Properties, Inc. v. Sharp, 949 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).  
 233 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1365.  See also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010).  
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invalid.234  At the very least, Cisco acted in a manner of “willful blindness” by 
not seeking a declaratory judgment on the validity of the patent before 
knowingly producing and selling the patented product unlawfully.235 
Further, Cisco’s actions made the full performance of the contract between 
Commil and the patent office impossible because the patent allowed Commil 
the ability to gain the full economic benefits from their creation for twenty 
years.236  Because of Cisco’s actions, Commil lost the full benefits of exclusivity 
afforded under the terms of the patent.237  Finally, Commil can show damages 
by offering evidence of Cisco’s profits from the patented product.238  
Since the concept of tortious interference with a contract is a blend of tort 
and contract law, the same principle that mistake is generally not a defense still 
applies.239  Cisco acted intentionally, knowing that there was a business and 
contractual relationship between the general public and the patent holder.240  
However, rather than presuming the enforceability of this contract and seeking 
the judicial remedies available to them through a declaratory judgment, Cisco 
acted at its peril by selling the patented product to the general public.241  
Therefore, the Court correctly imposed liability because neither the areas of tort 
law, contract law, or the blended concept of tortious interference with a 
contract recognize that a good faith belief can negate the specific intent prong 
of these causes of action.242  
4.  In the Context of Criminal Law.  The Supreme Court further found that the 
good faith belief in the invalidity of a patent defense is analogous to the mistake 
of law defense in the criminal context.243  Criminal law is publicly made and 
publicly prosecuted, and therefore differs from patent law, which is publicly 
made and privately prosecuted.244  However, principles of the mistake of law 
defense have previously offered the Court guidance on how to treat defendants 
                                                                                                                   
 234 See Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1929; see also Dennison, supra note 226, at 341–42 (stating, “The 
concept of ‘good faith’ is not measured by a subjective standard so that a misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation of the law excuses no one and provides no legal justification for unauthorized 
interference.  Subjective good faith, standing alone, is not an absolute defense to a claim of 
tortious interference with business relations, just as malice within the meaning of such a claim 
need not be prompted by bad faith or personal dislike.”). 
 235 See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. 2071–72.  
 236 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 237 Id.  
 238 Pl.[’s].–Appellee Br. Appeal at 23–24. 
 239 See Dennison, supra note 226, at 341.   
 240 Pl.[’s].–Appellee Br. Appeal at 32.  See also Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068.  
 241 Pl.[’s].–Appellee Br. Appeal at 37.  
 242 See Whittier, supra note 188, at 335–36; Dennison, supra note 226, at 341; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154, cmt. (c) (1981). 
 243 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930.  
 244 Turner, supra note 176, at 1012. 
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who assert that they mistakenly violated the law through a subjective good faith 
belief.245  
Like the mistake of law defense, those who assert that they had a good faith 
belief in the invalidity of a patent do not assert that they are necessarily 
innocent or not culpable.246  Induced infringers admit that their actions 
technically infringed upon the patent and perhaps facilitated the means by 
which others were able to infringe.247  However, they also claim that they did 
not have the culpable state of mind to be held liable for this infringement.248  
In Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit court 
“concluded that the alleged inducer did not possess the specific intent to 
encourage another’s infringement.”249  The Federal Circuit found that induced 
infringement claims should be treated like specific intent standards within the 
common law.250  For example, murder, “requires not only the general intent to 
engage in the acts constituting the offense, but an ‘additional deliberate and 
conscious purpose or design of accomplishing a very specific and remote 
result.’ ”251  Similarly, a patent holder in an infringement case must show not 
only that the inducer engaged in the acts that caused infringement, but also that 
the inducer had knowledge that infringement was likely to occur.252 As 
previously held by the Federal Circuit, knowledge of the patent’s existence can 
serve as evidence of the infringer or inducer’s intent.253  
In the criminal context, mistake of law is not a viable defense.254  Several 
reasons make the mistake of law defense problematic: 
[M]any justifications have been proffered for denying ignorance 
of the law defense: the difficulty of disproving a claim of 
ignorance, the goal of encouraging citizens to know and obey the 
                                                                                                                   
 245 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2062–63.  The Supreme Court looked to criminal law and applied it 
to the induced infringement context when establishing the notion of willful blindness.  
 246 See Holbrook, supra note 7, at 404–07.  
 247 See id.  
 248 See id.   
 249 917 F.2d at 553–54; Lei, supra note 166, at 879.  
 250 917 F.2d at 553–54.   
 251 Lei, supra note 166, at 879.  See also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12. 
 252 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12.  
 253 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2067–68.   
 254 See United States v. Rampton, 762 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating “[t]he general rule that 
ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no offense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in 
the American legal system.”  Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)); see also United 
States v. Lain, 640 F.3d 1134, 1139 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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law, and the need to prevent an accused person’s idiosyncratic 
interpretation from attaining the status of a legal rule.255 
The same concerns prevail in the patent context. 
As the Court recognized, proving a good faith belief of invalidity of a patent 
would mirror the same difficulties as proving ignorance of the law defense.256  
In general, the better policy is to assume that the general public knows the 
law.257  Like in the criminal context, where defendants argue that although they 
broke the law, this law should not be a law in the first place, the alleged inducer 
may argue that this product is not patentable.258  
In the present dispute, Cisco argued that the patent was invalid for similar 
reasons.259  The jury and the Supreme Court expressly rejected this assertion.260  
Thus, just as criminals may not assert that they knew there was a law, but 
thought it meant something else or that it was not a good law to begin with, 
Cisco cannot assert that it operated under a good faith belief the patent was 
invalid and escape liability.  As the Court realized, to hold otherwise would 
undermine the credibility of the Patent Office and Congress’s general 
authority.261    
C.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S HOLDING AND SOLUTION HAD 
THE SUPREME COURT DENIED CERT OR RECOGNIZED THE DEFENSE  
As the Court suggested, allowing the defense of good faith belief of the 
invalidity of a patent would remove any incentive to take preventive measures 
or to act cautiously.262  Just as willful blindness and ignorance are not valid 
defenses, a good faith belief that a patent is invalid may not be a defense 
either.263  The rationale is that in general, the law exists to discourage self-help 
remedies.264  
The Court proposed that the inducer has access to judicial resources to 
determine the validity of the patent at the outset, such as petitioning the PTO 
                                                                                                                   
 255 Alter, Kernochan & Darley, supra note 2, at 820.  
 256 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930.  
 257 See generally id.  
 258 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)(3) (2012).  
 259 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1365; Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930. 
 260 See Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930.  
 261 Id.   
 262 Id. at 1930–31. 
 263 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2063.  See Stark & Harasymiak, supra 
note 39.  
 264 Adam B. Badawi, Self-Help and the Rules of Engagement, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 1 (2012) (“Many 
areas of law . . . completely forbid the use of self-help.”).  
28
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol23/iss1/5
2015]         A GOOD FAITH BELIEF OF INVALIDITY DEFENSE  141 
 
for post grant review or a declaratory judgment.265  Not utilizing this tool, 
which the courts provide when the inducer knows that there has been a patent 
granted, defeats the argument that the inducer acted in good faith.  One who 
truly acts in good faith would arguably confer with the patent holder, the Patent 
Office, or the courts from the start.266  Good faith does not condone the 
“better to ask forgiveness than permission” approach that occurred here, and 
the Supreme Court rightfully rejected any notion of good faith in this situation.  
Further, the Court recognized that the potential for fraud and deceit is great 
because a good faith belief defense is merely subjective and impossible to 
ascertain.267  Any time a party is accused of induced infringement, the inducer 
will merely argue that he did not believe the patent was truly valid, which would 
defeat liability.268  This creates a confusing and impossibly subjective inquiry for 
jurors.269  As the Court further articulated, allowing the defense would also 
undermine the integrity of the patent process and rob patent holders of the 
security their patents provide.270  Allowing such a defense contradicts not only 
the aims of the patent process but also Congress’s expressed preference to 
presume the validity of patents,271 which demands the rejection of the good 
faith belief of invalidity of a patent defense.272  
The inducer unquestionably is in the best position to assert invalidity at the 
outset with a declaratory judgment or through petitioning for reconsideration 
through the PTO, for litigation is a costly matter.273  In the present dispute, the 
parties went through two trials at the district court level, an appeal to the 
Federal Circuit, and a Supreme Court hearing four years later.274  In reality, had 
Cisco sought a declaratory judgment at the outset to determine the validity of 
the patent, this entire dispute could have been resolved without tying up as 
                                                                                                                   
 265 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930; 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).  
 266 Such a notion is not uncommon within the common law and relates back to the standard of 
the reasonable man we see in the tort context.  Just as tortfeasors may be liable for acts and 
omissions that fall below the standard of care, so too should inducers in the above situation.  See 
Baltimore & P.R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U.S. 439 (1877).  
 267 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1931; see also Alter, Kernochan & Darley, supra note 2, at 820. 
 268 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930. 
 269 Id.  
 270 Id. at 1929; ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 2; 
Pl.[‘s].–Appellee Br. Appeal at 47. 
 271 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
 272 ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 13. 
 273 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (“To await litigation is-
for all practical purposes-to debilitate the patent system.”). 
 274 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc. (Commil I), 2011 WL 738871 (E.D. Tex., Feb. 23, 
2011), aff’d, 410 Fed. Appx. 339 (Fed. Cir. Tex. Mar. 4, 2011), 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. Tex., June 
25, 2010), rehearing denied (October 25, 2013), cert. granted in part, 720 F.3d 1361 (Dec. 5, 2014). 
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much judicial time and resources and without the massive cost to both the 
inducer and the patent holder.  
To allow a good faith belief of invalidity defense when the inducer has failed 
to go through the judicial remedies afforded to them at the outset would have 
condoned this wasteful behavior. By allowing this to occur, the Supreme Court 
would have contravened of Congress’s intent and disincentived creators and 
producers because they could not rely on the security of their patents, and they 
would have been forced to defend their patents rights through costly and 
lengthy litigation.275 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court wisely rejected the defense of a good faith 
belief of invalidity of patents.  Acknowledging such an exception would have 
been akin to allowing the inducer to assert that he was mistaken about the 
validity of a patent and escape liability for inducement.  Mistake has never been 
recognized as a valid defense in the fundamental areas of common law, 
including tort, contract, and criminal law. 
By rejecting the newly proffered affirmative defense, the Court upheld 
Congress’s expressed wishes by reinforcing the presumption of the validity of 
patents.  Especially in this context, Cisco had no legitimate defense because it 
failed to exhaust the judicial remedies afforded through a declaratory judgment 
or through petitioning the patent office.  As the old saying goes, “the road to 
hell is paved with good intentions.”  Thankfully, the Supreme Court decided 
not to take that route here.  
 
                                                                                                                   
 275  See Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1929; Pl.[‘s].–Appellee Br. Appeal at 47. 
30
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol23/iss1/5
